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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ROSEMARY ABBOTT, 
Plai/otiff-Appei 1<* ;t, 
vs • 
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE 
NEBO SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al., 
Defendants-Respondents 
Case No, 14,409 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT 
NATURE OF CASE 
This is an action for violation of Plaintiff-Appellant1s 
rights created by the Utah Orderly School Termination Procedures 
Act, Sections 53-51-1 et seq., Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, 
for breach of contract, and for violation of Plaintiff-Appellant!s 
rights to due process. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to the court. From a Judgment 
and Order dismissing the Complaint, Plaintiff appeals. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversal of the judgment and judgment 
in her favor as a matter of law awarding her damages for her lost 
salary and other benefits of employment and for an order reinstating 
her as an employee of Respondent. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Appellant, Rosemary Abbott, was and is a teacher 
holding a certificate to teach public schools in the State of 
Utah. Following a year of teaching in the State of Texas, 
Appellant made application to Respondent for a teaching position 
and was employed at the beginning of the 1973-74 school year to 
teach one-half day of fifth grade at the Goshen Elementary School 
and as an aid at the Santaquin Elementary School for the remainder 
of the day. In January, 1974, she was given a full time contract 
of employment to teach fifth grade at the Goshen Elementary School. 
Subsequently, she was given a contract of employment for the 1974-75 
school year to again teach the fifth grade at Goshen Elementary 
School. Stipulated Facts R.20. 
On March 27, 1975, the Respondent, through its Superintendent 
Joe A. Reidhead, caused a letter to be delivered to Appellant which 
informed her that she would not be offered a teaching contract for 
the 1975-76 school year. A copy of that letter is attached hereto 
as Appendix "A". Appendix "A" is the first and only notice Appellant 
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received regarding the termination of her employment with Respondent. 
The letter did not contain a written statement of causes or reasons 
why Appellant would not be offered a teaching contract for the 
1975-76 school year, or that Appellant could request an informal 
conference before the Board of Education or such personnel as the 
Respondent designated. Thereafter, on at least two occasions, 
Appellant requested from the Respondent a statement of the reasons 
for her termination, but her requests were refused by Respondent. 
Stipulated Facts R.20-21 and Appendix "A". 
Following compliance with several steps of the grievance 
procedure established by the Respondent, Appellant requested a 
hearing before the Board of Education of the Nebo School District. 
A hearing was set for May 13, 1975. Prior to the date of the hearing, 
Appellant requested that the Respondent make and provide her with 
copies of material in her personnel file. The Respondent refused 
to make such copies but advised Appellant that she could examine 
her file. The Appellant, through her representatives, had requested 
that Mr. William B. Stansfield, Principal at Goshen Elementary 
School, and Appellantfs immediate supervisor, be present at the 
hearing, but Respondent informed Mr. Stansfield that his presence 
at the hearing would not be necessary. Mr. Stansfield did not 
attend the hearing. Stipulated Facts R.21. 
3 
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Appellant appeared at the hearing in person and was also 
represented by her legal counsel. At the hearing, Appellant's 
legal counsel requested that the Board of Education specify its 
reasons for not offering Appellant a contract of employment for 
the 1975-76 school year. In response, the Board of Education of 
the Nebo School District, advised Appellant that it had no 
obligation under its contract of employment with its educators and 
that it was not the policy of the Board to provide a statement of 
reasons why a "qualifying" educator would not be offered a teaching 
contract for any ensuing year. The Board took the position that 
the only issues to be considered at the hearing would be her status 
as a "qualifying" educator and whether or not she had been properly 
and timely given notice that she would not be offered a teaching 
contract for the 1975-76 school year as required by her contract. 
Stipulated Facts R.21. 
A document bearing the date of August 3, 1974, entitled 
"An Agreement between the Board of Education of the Nebo School 
District and the Nebo Education Association" (hereinafter "Agreement"), 
contained the personnel and employment policies in effect for the 
period August 3, 1974 through May 31, 1975, was duly negotiated 
between the Respondent and its educators. The Agreement was 
incorporated by reference into the employment contract of the 
4 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Appellant and all other educators employed by Respondent. Pursuant 
to the provisions of the Agreement, Appellant was during the time 
of her employment with Respondent a "qualifying11 educator. 
Stipulated Facts R.22. 
Section 18-3-4 of the Agreement provides in relevant 
part: 
. . . the aggrieved party may request, through the 
superintendent, a hearing before the Board. The 
Board shall review the grievance at the earliest 
possible Board meeting after receipt of the 
request. The Board will act upon such request 
with (within?) 40 calendar days. The Board may 
grant, or refuse the grievance or may submit it 
to arbitration. The Board's decision will be final. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 14. 
Section 18-5-5 of the Agreement provides in relevant 
part: 
Prior to the Level Three hearings (Section 18-3-4 
above), all parties of interest shall makeavailable 
to the parties involved and their representatives, 
all pertinent information not privileged under the 
law, in their possession or control and which is 
relevant to the issues raised by the grievance. 
Plaintiff1 s Exhibit No. 14, 
In the present case, the Respondent refused to state its 
reasons for terminating the Appellant, refused to permit Mr. Stansfie 
to be present at the hearing and refused to permit Appellant to 
copy the contents of her personnel file or to provide copies to 
Appellant's counsel. Stipulated Facts R.21. 
5 
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Appendix f,Aff of the Agreement provides in relevant part: 
I# Procedures for Evaluation - Qualifying Educators. 
1. By January 15th of each year, the principal 
will submit an evaluation of all qualifying 
educators assigned to his school provided they 
have been employed for at least two months. 
2. On April 1 of each year, the principal 
will submit a second evaluation for: 
a. All qualifying educators whose stat s 
has changed significantly since January. 
b* All educators whose evaluations were 
"less than satisfactory" in January. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 14. 
Evaluations of Appellant were conducted by January 15th 
for the 1973-74 and 1974-75 school years, but no evaluation was 
conducted by the principal (or anyone else) after the January, 1975 
evaluation even though the principal knew that there would be a 
change in Appellant's position. T. 30. See Appellantfs evaluations 
attached hereto as Appendixes "B-l", "B-2" and "B-3ff. The record 
shows that Appellant's January, 1975 evaluation did not show 
Appellant to be an educator whose performance was "less than 
satisfactory11. 
Section 7-1 of the Agreement provides: 
Evaluations of an educator's performance based 
on established district standards shall be 
conducted in accordance with accepted professional 
personnel practices. The educator will be fully 
informed by the principal as to how such evaluation 
shall be conducted. 
& 
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Section 7-2 of the Agreement provides: 
Educators will be given a copy of any evaluation 
report and will discuss such report with the 
person preparing it before it is submitted to 
the district office for inclusion in the educatorfs 
permanent file. After such review, the educator 
shall affix his signature to indicate that he is 
aware of the contents of the report. Such 
signature does not necessarily indicate agreement 
with the content of such material. 
In the present case, Mr. Stansfield testified that 
Appellant was evaluated many times, but that she signed only three 
evaluations and was not informed about the other evaluations. T. 31. 
Further, Appellant was not evaluated after January, 1975. Even 
then, Appellant's evaluations did not show her performance to be 
less than satisfactory. The formal evaluations of Appellant show 
her to be a satisfactory teacher. See Appendixes !lB-lfl, flB-2ff and 
,fB~3n. 
Section 5-6 of the Agreement provides: 
Unless a contract of employment shall expressly 
provide otherwise, a qualifying educator shall 
be deemed to be employed for a period of one 
school year. Each qualifying educator may deem 
himself to be re-employed for the succeeding 
year unless otherwise notified to the contrary 
by the Board of Education in the manner herein-
after provided. 
Appellant submits that as she was not notified or evaluated 
in the manner required in the Agreement, she had both a ,fpropertyf? 
interest and contractual right to be re-employed for the 1975-76 
school year. 
7 
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Appellant submits that Respondent has an employment 
practice of hiring and retaining its qualifying educators. The 
following table* shows the number of qualifying educators hired 
by the Respondent for its school years 1970-71 through 1974-75 
together with the number of qualifying educators dismissed by the 
Respondent for cause. 
School Year Teachers Hired Teachers Dismissed 
for Cause 
1970-71 46 1 
1971-72 59 0 
1972-73 39 1 
1973-74 42 2 
1974-75 48 1 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE UTAH 
ORDERLY SCHOOL TERMINATION PROCEDURES ACT, 
SECTIONS 53-51-1 ET SEQ., UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 
1953, AS AMENDED, DOES NOT APPLY IN THIS CASE. 
Appellant submits that the Utah Orderly School Termination 
Procedures Act, Sections 53-51-1 et seq., Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
as amended (hereinafter "Act"), governs the procedures which 
Respondent must follow to terminate Appellant. Respondent concedes 
that it did not comply with the procedures required in the Act, but 
argues that the Act does not apply in this case. Appellant submits 
that the Act applies to her for two reasons: (1) the Act requires 
^Compiled from the testimony of Joe A. Reidhead. T. 17 and 18. 
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a fair hearing for all teachers (or educators) who are terminated 
by a school district; and (2) Appellant had a "reasonable expectation 
of continued employment in succeeding years/1 
Section 53-51-2 of the Act provides: 
The purpose of this act is to require school districts 
to adopt orderly termination procedures and to specify 
standards of due process and causes for termination. 
Section 53-51-3 provides in relevant part: 
As used in this act: 
(2) "Dismissal11 or "termination" means: 
(a) Any termination of the status of 
employment of an educator. 
(b) Failure to renew the employment contract 
of an educator who pursuant to the employment 
practices of the school district has a 
reasonable expectation of continued employ-
ment in successive years. 
(3) "Educator" or "teacher" means all teaching and 
professional personnel of a school, district who 
hold positions requiring certification and valid 
certificates issued to them by the State Board 
of Education. 
Section 53-51-4 of the Act provides: 
The board of education of each school district by 
contract with its educators or their associations 
or by resolution of the board shall establish 
procedures for termination of educators in an 
orderly manner without discrimination. 
9 
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Section 53-51-5 of the Act provides in relevant part that 
"the orderly dismissal procedure adopted by a school district shall 
provide: (1) Right to a fair hearing.11 
Section 53-51-6 of the Act provides: 
At all hearings, after due notice and demand of 
the educator, he may be represented by counsel, 
produce witnesses, hear the testimony against 
him and cross-examine the witnesses and examine 
documentary evidence. Hearings may be held before 
the board or the board may establish a procedure 
whereby hearing is before examiners . . . . 
Appellant was a teacher employed by the Respondent. 
Respondent determined not to renew Appellant's contract of employment 
for the 1975-76 school year and so advised her. In response to 
Respondent's notification to her, Appellant requested a hearing 
before the Board of Education of Respondent. The Board set a 
time on its regular agenda to hear Appellant, but Respondent 
failed and refused both at the hearing and prior thereto to 
provide Appellant with a statement of its reasons for not 
renewing Appellant's contract of employment. It further refused 
to permit Mr. William Stansfield, Appellant's Principal 
and immediate supervisor, to be present at the hearing, and 
thereby effectively denied Appellant the opportunity to "hear the 
testimony against . . • (her) and to cross-examine witnesses and 
examine documentary evidence." Respondent also refused to produce 
10 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
and permit Appellant to copy documents contained in her personnel 
file. 
Appellant submits that Respondent's actions, as above 
stated, denied her minimal due process required by Sections 53-51-5(1) 
and 53-51-6 of the Act. 
Appellant submits that the Utah Orderly School Termination 
Procedures Act requires that she be given a fair hearing, if requested 
by her, as a condition precedent to her termination by Respondent. At 
the hearing, Appellant is entitled to hear the testimony against her, 
to cross-examine witnesses, to examine documentary evidence and 
to know the reasons for her termination. As the Respondent failed 
to afford the Appellant a fair hearing, Appellant is entitled to 
the relief she seeks. 
Secondly, Appellant submits that the Act creates a 
second category of teachers who are entitled to more than the 
minimal due process required by Sections 53-51-5(1) and 53-51-6. 
Section 53-51-5 of the Act provides in relevant part: 
(2) If the district intends not to renew (the) 
contract of employment of an individual entitled 
to employment in succeeding years according to the 
district personnel program, notice of such 
intention shall be given the individual. Said 
notice shall be issued at least two months before 
the end of the contract term of the individual, 
e.g., the school year. The notice in writing shall 
be served by personal delivery or by certified mail 
addressed to the individuals last known address. 
Notice shall be dated and contain a clear and 
concise statement that the individual's contract 
will not be renewed for an ensuing term and the 
reasons for the termination. (Emphasis added.) Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
(3) In the absence of timely notice, a subparagraph 
(2) employee is deemed to be re-employed for the 
succeeding contract term with a salary based upon 
the salary schedule applicable to the class of 
employee into which the individual falls. This 
provision shall not be construed to preclude the 
dismissal of an employee during his contract term 
for cause. 
(4) At least one month prior to issuing notice 
of intent not to renew the contract of the 
individual, he shall be informed of the fact that 
continued employment is in question and the reasons 
therefor and given an opportunity to correct the 
defects which precipitated possible nonrenewal. 
The individual may be granted assistance in his 
efforts to make correction of the deficiencies 
which may include informal conferences and the 
services of applicable school personnel within 
the district. 
Appellant submits that the employment practices of 
Respondent created a reasonable expectation of continued employment 
for all teachers hired by it. The testimony of Joe A. Reidhead,* 
Superintendent of Respondent, showed that only 2.1% of all teachers 
hired by Respondent from the 1970-71 through 1974-75 school years 
were terminated. Furthermore, the Respondent's Agreement 
provides that "qualifying educators" would be evaluated by 
January 15th of each year. A copy of Appellant's evaluations 
are attached hereto as Appendixes "B-l", "B-2M and "B-3". Those 
*Table above at page 8. 
12 
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evaluations show that Appellant was an average 
teacher employed by the District. It should be noted that her 
first evaluation dated April 30, 1973, showed Appellant to be 
below average in three categories. Her second evaluation dated 
February 8, 1974 showed her to be an average teacher and her 
third and last evaluation dated January, 1975 showed her to be 
below average in only one category. 
Appendix flA,! of Respondent's Agreement, set forth above, 
provides that educators are to be evaluated during January of each 
year. Educators whose status has changed, are to be evaluated 
in "April" of each year. It is admitted by the Respondent that 
it did not perform the second evaluation in April of 1975 as it 
should have done pursuant to the terms of its Agreement. T.30. 
13 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In Sigmon v. Poe« 381 F. Supp. 387 at p. 392 (D.C.N.C. 
1974) the court held: 
The defendant, Board of Education, had a practice 
and the Superintendent issued a directive requiring 
principals in the fall of the year to report teachers 
whom they intended to rate as unsatisfactory, and to 
nbe sure that each employee in your school . . . is 
aware that he or she may make a written response to 
the complaints, commendations and suggestions.u This 
was not done. Mr. Jaynes1 (the defendant's principal) 
adverse report of October, 1973, in furtherance of his 
decision not to renew plaintiff's contract, was a 
secret report never communicated to the plaintiff 
until late the following spring. The plaintiff had 
an interest under established procedures in knowing 
of this adverse action, and the secret report by the 
principal was a violation of her right to have that 
knowledge. This B a violation of a property right 
which entitles her to a due process hearing. 
In the instant case, the Respondent, through its Agreement, 
had agreed with its employees that if evaluations of its educators 
would be based on established district standards and that the 
educator would be fully informed by the principal as to how such 
evaluations were to be conducted. The educators were to be given 
a copy of the evaluation report and an opportunity to discuss the 
report with the person preparing it before it was submitted to 
the district office. The district's Agreement also required the 
educator to sign the report as an indication that he is aware of 
the contents of the report. Article 7-1 and 7-2 of the Agreement 
(text set forth at pp. 6 and 7 above)• 
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Appendix lfAfl of the Agreement also requires that the 
principal submit a second evaluation on April 1st of each year 
for: 
a. All qualifying educators whose status has 
changed significantly since January. 
b. All educators whose evaluations were "less 
than satisfactory11 in January. 
In the instant case, no such evaluation was prepared or 
submitted. Accordingly, pursuant to the criteria of the Sigmon 
case, supra, Appellant had a property right and reasonable expectation 
of continued employment, at least through the following school year. 
Accord, Francis v. Ota, 356 F. Supp. 1029 at pp. 1033-1034 
(D.Haw. 1973), where the court held that a non-tenured guidance 
counselor and registrar at a community college had a legitimate 
expectation of continued employment unless and until the administration 
deprived him of that expectation in a manner consistent with its 
established procedures and policies. 
Appellant submits that, based upon the employment practices 
and policies of the Respondent, she had a reasonable expectation of 
continued employment on either of the following grounds: 
A. Respondent did not evaluate Appellant's performance 
in the manner required of it by its own Agreement and it 
failed to perform the second evaluation by April 1st as 
required by Appendix nAlf of the Agreement, or 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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B# Respondent terminates only approximately 2.1% of 
its probationary teachers. 
Because Respondent has created in Appellant a reasonable 
expectation of continued employment, Respondent must comply with the 
requirements of subsections (2), (3) and (4) of Section 53-51-5 of 
the Act. It is admitted by Respondent that it has not complied 
with the provisions of the Act. 
Accordingly, Appellant is entitled to the relief which 
she requests. 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT 
WAS NOT IN BREACH OF THE CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT 
WITH APPELLANT (THE AGREEMENT). 
Appellant submits that Respondent is in breach of its 
Agreement with Appellant for the reasons that it: 
(a) Terminated her without affording her a fair hearing; 
(b) Failed and refused to provide her with pertinent 
information in its possession and control; 
(c) Failed to conduct the evaluations of Appellant 
in the manner required of it by the Agreement; and 
(d) Failed and refused to comply with the Agreement 
with respect to conducting evaluations of Appellant. 
16 
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In Point I above, Appellant has set forth her arguments 
with respect to Respondent's failure to follow the provisions of 
the Agreement with respect to the method for conducting evaluations 
of her performance. The record clearly shows that Respondent did 
not comply with Sections 7-1 and 7-2 of the Agreement. Nor did the 
Respondent comply with the provisions of Appendix ffAfl of the 
Agreement. 
Section 18-5-5 of the Agreement requires Respondent to 
make available to Appellant and her representatives "all pertinent 
information not privileged under law, in their possession or control 
and which is relevant to the issues raised by the grievance.11 It 
is admitted that the Respondent refused to permit Appellant to 
make copies of the information contained in her file, although it 
did permit her to look at the file. Appellant had also requested 
that Mr. Stansfield, Appellant's principal and supervisor, attend 
the hearing, but Respondent directed Mr. Stansfield not to attend 
the meeting. 
As Respondent is in breach of its Agreement with Appellant, 
Respondent should be ordered to pay Appellant damages and to 
reinstate her until such time as it complies with the terms of the 
Agreement. 
17 
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POINT III 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT APPELLANT 
HAD NO PROPERTY RIGHT TO BE PROTECTED BY 
DUE PROCESS. 
The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States provides that no state shall . . . "deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or of property, without due process of 
law . . • ." 
Article 1, Section 7 of the Constitution of Utah provides: 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property, without due process of law. 
Appellant submits that both the law and facts set forth 
in Points I and II above, afford Appellant a property rirht of which 
she may not be deprived without due process of law. 
In Christiansen v. Harris, 109 Utah 1, 163 P.2ci 314 (1945), 
this court held that the essential elements of due process are: 
(a) The existence of a competent person, body, or 
agenc}r authorized by law to determine the question; 
(b) An inquiry into the merits of the question by 
such person, body or agency; 
(c) Notice to the person of the inauguration and 
purpose of the inquiry and the time at which such 
person should appear if he wishes to be heard; 
18 
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(d) Right to appear in person or by counsel; 
(e) Fair opportunity to submit evidence, examine 
and cross-examine witnesses; and 
(f) Judgment to be rendered on the record thus made. 
In the case of the Board of Regents of State Colleges v. 
Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), Mr. Roth, an untenured teacher employed 
by Wisconsin State University, sought an order of the Federal Courts 
enjoining the University from terminating his employment for the 
reason that he had requested and had been denied a statement of the 
reasons for the University!s decision not to rehire him for another 
year. Mr. Roth had also requested and had been denied a hearing 
regarding his termination. The Court held that absent a showing 
by the Plaintiff of a "property" or "liberty" interest, the University 
need not provide Mr. Roth a statement of its reasons for not renewing 
his contract or to afford him an opportunity for a hearing. In 
the Roth case, supra, the Court set forth certain standards relevant 
to this case. The Court held: 
To have a property interest in a benefit, a 
person clearly must have more than an abstract 
need or desire for it. He must have more than 
a unilateral expectation of it. Hamust, 
instead, have a ligitimate claim of entitlement 
to it. It is the purpose of the ancient institution 
of property to protect those claims upon which 
people rely in their daily lives, reliance that 
must not be arbitrarily undermined. It is a 
purpose of the constitutional right to a hearing 
to provide an opportunity for a person to vindicate 
those claims. 
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Property interests, of course, are not created by 
the Constitution. Rather, they are created and 
their dimensions are defined by existing rules 
or understandings that stem from an independent 
source such as state law -- rules or understandings 
that secure certain benefits and that support 
claims of entitlement to those benefits. 
408 U.S. 577. 
In Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972), the court 
was concerned with a college teacher employed in a state college 
system under a series of one year contracts for a period of ten 
years. Following the 1968-69 school year, the governing board 
voted not to offer him a new contract for the following year. He 
was given no reason for the nonrenewal of his contract nor with an 
opportunity to challenge any basis for the nonrenewal. Using the 
criteria developed in Roth, supra, the court found that Mr. Sindermann 
had a property interest to be protected by due process. The court 
held: 
A written contract with an explicit tenure 
provision clearly is evidence of a formal 
understanding that supports a teacher's 
claim of entitlement to continued employment 
unless sufficient "cause" is shown. Yet, 
absence of such an explicit contractual 
provision may not always foreclose the 
possibility that a teacher has a "property" 
interest in re-employment . . . . Explicit 
contractual provisions may be supplemented 
by other agreements implied from "the 
promisors words and conduct in light of the 
surrounding circumstances . . . and (t)he 
meaning of (t)he promisors words and acts 
is found by relating them to the usage of 
the past. 408 U.S. 601-602. 
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In the instant case, the Utah Orderly School Termination 
Procedures Act requires that Respondent give Appellant a "fair 
hearing" and a statement of reasons for the nonrenewal of her 
contract of employment. The Act sets forth the elements of a fair 
hearing with which Respondent must comply. 
Appellant further submits that even if the Utah Orderly 
School Termination Procedures Act does not apply in this case, she 
had a protected property interest because of the policies and practice* 
of the Respondent with respect to: 
A, Respondents duties to evaluate Appellant's 
performance as an educator, which evaluations were not 
conducted in the manner required by the provisions of the 
Agreement. In Francis v. Ota, 356 F. Supp. 1029 at pp. 
1033-1034 (D.C.Haw. 1973), the court held that the failure of 
the college to follow its own established procedures created 
in the school teacher a "legitimate expectation of future 
employment." 
B* Respondent's practice of renewing the employment 
of its probationary teachers. Accord, Lusk v. Estes, 361 
F. Supp. 653 (N.D.Tex. 1973), wherein the court held that 
a teacher had a "property" interest where he was justified 
in expecting continued employment in light of the practices 
and policies of the school. 
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Appellant submits that she had a protected property-
interest for the reasons suggested in Points I and II of this Brief. 
The foregoing decisions of the courts of the United States show 
that she had been denied the due process required by the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. 
Appellant urges this Court to find that she has also been 
denied due process under Article 1, Section 7 of the Constitution 
of Utah. See Untermeyer v. State Tax Commission, 102 Utah 214, 
129 P.2d 881 (1942), wherein this court held that the decisions of 
the United States Supreme Court are highly persuasive as to the 
application of Article 1, Section 7 of the Constitution of Utah. 
Even if this Court finds that the Utah Orderly School Termination 
Procedures Act is not applicable to Appellant, nevertheless, 
Appellant is entitled to due process because of the Respondent's 
failure to comply with its own Agreement and because of the practices 
and policies of the Respondent. Appellant suggests that the elements 
of due process which should be afforded her are found in Christiansen 
v. Harris, supra. 
22 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
It is respectfully submitted that the Utah Orderly 
School Termination Procedures Act and the policies and practices 
of the Respondent have created in the Appellant a protected 
"property" interest which requires due process before Respondent 
may lawfully terminate Appellantfs employment. Until such time 
as she is afforded the due process, Appellant should be awarded 
damages for loss of salary and Respondent should be ordered to 
reinstate Appellant as a teacher and educator at a salary 
together with such benefits as she would have had had she not 
been improperly terminated by Respondent. 
CONCLUSIONS 
1. The Utah Orderly School Termination Procedures Act, 
Sections 53-51-1 et seq., 1953, as amended, requires the Respondent 
School District to provide in its policies for orderly termination 
of its teachers, an opportunity for a fair hearing. The elements 
of the fair hearing are set forth at Section 53-51-6, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, as amended. Respondent has failed to comply with 
the hearing requirements of that Act. 
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2. Appellant had a ''reasonable expectation of continued 
employment" within the meaning of the Utah Orderly School Termination 
Procedures Act, supra, for the reasons that: 
(a) Only 2.170 of all teachers hired by the Respondent 
from the 1970-71 through 1974-75 school years were terminated. 
(b) Respondent's evaluations of Appellant showed her 
to be an average teacher. The Agreement required Respondent 
to evaluate Appellant, if it were determined that her status 
had changed, by April 1, 1975. That evaluation was never 
performed. Many of the "informal" evaluations of the 
Appellant were done in secret and without Appellant's 
knowledge contrary to the requirements of Respondent's 
Agreement with Appellant. 
3. Respondent breached its Agreement with Appellant 
in that it: 
(a) Terminated Appellant without affording her a 
fair hearing, 
(b) Failed and refused to provide Appellant with 
pertinent information in its possession and control which 
Appellant considered relevant to her case, 
(c) Failed to conduct the evaluations of Appellant in 
the manner required of it by the Agreement, and 
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(d) Failed and refused to comply with the provisions of 
the Agreement with respect to conducting the evaluations of 
Appellantfs performance as a teacher• 
4. The Utah Orderly School Termination Procedures Act, 
supra, and the Agreement created in the Appellant a "property11 right 
of which the Appellant may not be deprived without due process of 
law under the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States and Article 1, Section 7 of the 
Constitution of Utah. 
5. Appellant should be awarded damages for her lost 
salary and other benefits and reinstated as a teacher employed 
by Respondent until such time as she is afforded due process by 
Respondent. 
Respectfully submitted, 
yj/fVltf 
MICHAEL T. McCOY 
414 Walker Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, tJtah 84111 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant 
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. « A 1 D' Jot A R*dh*ad. Son#*n/#or*inf 
Of V«mo« J Tipton./VW,<rt„f A P P E N D I X " A " A A ^"°'Jr^; , h 5?"'""""•' 
>* * • LJ i # 4 1 P o y r 1 Goodrich Instruction 
f id l Hank$, y/ca President I #1 I 0 ™ M Hanson Ope^ons 
Oyd« A Swenson If II 
Lynn Crook — " Xl/ 
HughHjOfth "| r 
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION . f\iiEBOl/SCHOQL 
60 SOUTH MAIN STREET • SPANISH FORK, UTAH 84660 • PHONE 798-3586 - 489-5152 1 / D I S T R I C T 
March 27, 1975 
Ms. Rosemary S. Abbott 
40 North 800 East 
Spanish Fork, Utah 84660 
Dear Ms. Abbott: 
Pursuant to an Agreement between the Nebo Board of Education 
and the Nebo Education Association, and according to Article 5 - 6 , 
I am hereby notifying you on this 27th day of March, 1975, that you 
will not be offered a teaching contract for the coming school year of 
1975-76. 
Sincerely yours, 
c CT. ^^< 
Joe A, Reidhead 
Superintendent 
JAR/cb 
cc: Principal Boyd Stansfield 
Nebo Education Association •* 
? / \ 
26 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
16 of Teacher 
x>l 
A I ^ ^ - M ^ S ^ X A A/ 
JJ^^JL,*^} V 
QJUnXt 
NEBO SCHOOL DISTRICT 
Period Covered 
%
. 1973 to JLl" /?79 
^rfi w „ 
_ Grade or Subjects Taught K^.2U^J.. 
PERSONAL TRAITS 
, Voice: Quality and Articulation . . 
, Genuine Liking for Students . . . . 
CHOLARSHIP 
, Mastery of Subject Matter . . . . . 
, Correct and Fluent English 
, General Educational Background . . 
, Knowledge of Source Materials . • . 
EACHING METHODS 
, Org. of Learning Experiences. • . . 
, Motivation of Student Interest . . . 
, Provides differentiated assignments 
, Awareness and Use of Life Situations 
, Stimulation of Critical Thinking . . 
, Use of Resources and Media . . . . 
, Evaluation of Student Progress . . . 
, Provides for Pupil-Pupil Interaction 
ILASS MANAGEMENT 
Organization of Routine Details . . 
Control of Classroom Situation • . . 
ROFESSIONAL ATTITUDE 
Attitude Toward Teaching Profession 
• _ — • • — _ _ 
Sunerior 
Very 
Gootf Average, 
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—f— 
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~t 
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, 
. 
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....;.. 
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*, 
Below 
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Unsatis-
factory 
1 Principal Comment: 
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\pkJLo uf<r>JLJLMA 
op^j^^. 
Teacher Comment: 
• 
LEASE NOTE ANY SPECIAL ABILITIES 
JDICATE CHARACTERISTICS WHICH INTERFERE WITH SUCCESS 
I TEACHER GENERALLY LKED BY PUPILS? lUAZ. 2 BY PARENTS? if 'Aid J 
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NEBO SCHOOL DISTRICT 
Period Covered to 
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Grade or Subjects Taught ^y — 
RSONAL TRAITS 
Voice: Quality and Articulation . . 
Genuine Liking for Students . • . . 
HOLARSHIP 
Mastery of Subject Matter 
Correct and Fluent English 
General Educational Background . , 
Knowledge of Source Materials . . . 
ACHING METHODS 
Org. of Learning Experiences• • • . 
Motivation of Student Interest . . • 
Provides differentiated assignments 
Creativity 
Awareness and Use of Life Situations 
Stimulation of Critical Thinking . . 
Use of Resources and Media . . . . 
Evaluation of Student Progress . . . 
Provides for Pupil-Pupil Interaction 
\SS MANAGEMENT 
Organization of Routine Details . • 
Control of Classroom Situation . . . 
DFESSIONAL ATTITUDE 
Jtttitude Toward Teaching Profession 
i Suoerior 
Very 
Good 
S 
\S i * • • ' • 
— _ _ _ 
y 
y/ 
1 / 
1 / 
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Principal Comment: 
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1 Teacher Comment: 
. . 
ASE NOTE ANY SPECIAL ABILITIES 
)ICATE CHARACTERISTICS WHICH INTERFERE WITH SUCCESS 
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AJrrfcNDlX "B-J" 
NEBO SCHOOL DISTRICT 
> of Teacher 
Oonhen 
Bosemary Abbott Period Covered Aug. 1974 to 
1/15/70 > ^ 
Jan. 1975 
Di Grade or Subjects Taught 5th Grade 
. 
IRSONAL TRAITS ! 
Voice: Quality and Articulation . . 
Genuine Liking for Students . . . . 
3HOLARSHIP 
Mastery of Subject Matter 
Correct and Fluent English 
General Educational Background . . 
Knowledge of Source Materials . . . 
ACHING METHODS 
Org. of Learning Experiences. . . . 
Motivation of Student Interest . . . 
Provides differentiated assignments 
Awareness and Use of Life Situations 
Stimulation of Critical Thinking . . 
Use of Resources and Media . . . . 
Evaluation of Student Progress . . . 
Provides for Pupil-Pupil Interaction 
ASS MANAGEMENT . 
Organization of Routine Details . . 
Control of Classroom Situation . . . 
OFESSIONAL ATTITUDE 
Attitude Toward Teaching Profession 
_«_«____.-_ , , *__ 
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/ 
~~7— 
/ 
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Teacher Comment: 
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EASE NOTE ANY SPECIAL ABILITIES 
DICATE CHARACTERISTICS WHICH INTERFERE WITH SUCCESS 
TEACHER GENERALLY LIKED BY PUPILS 
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